home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Internet Info 1994 March
/
Internet Info CD-ROM (Walnut Creek) (March 1994).iso
/
inet
/
ietf
/
92jul
/
tadmin-minutes-92jul.txt
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-02-17
|
9KB
|
244 lines
The following is a cleaned up version of the slide set for the
Trusted Administration working group summary report on 7/16/92.
This document will be archived.
Page breaks (via <ctrl>L's) have been included.
TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
Activities:
Item Result
-------------------------------- --------------------------------------------
1. Trusted Admin - Still lack a solid proposal from any
vendor.
- Brainstormed the problem at some length
from the perspective of "If I am a machine
on the network, in order to be
administered from a central place I have
to be able to ..." and generated a list
of these items (attached).
- Started sorting/reducing this list into
musts, high wants and low wants.
- Need to leverage work from other working
groups (POSIX etc.) working on the
general administration problem.
- May want to further refine this list
via electronic forum.
2. Audit Transfer
a. AITP (formally SITP) - We have an updated AITP draft on the
TSIG archive.
b. Reviewed SNMP/SMP
capabilities as possible
audit transfer mechanism.
Areas of possible concern
were:
- How does S*MP paradigm (a - At any given time a snap shot of the
name space corresponding available audit records on a system can
to a few control elements be indexed field name (column) and
on a device) map to instance identifier (row). This is
thousands of audit arbitrary but workable.
record?
- Can any message priority - Neither S*MP or AITP do this.
(alarms before bulk data
upload) be provided.
- Assured delivery, order - AITP relies on TCP where S*MP usually
and integrity. runs over UDP therefore AITP is "more
reliable" however if problems occur that
require resynchronization at the
application level, the variable and
instance information built into the
var-binds may provide better information
to the application for this purpose.
- Audit data volume (on the - SNMP (w/o bulk transfer) is a non-starter.
order of 20Mb/user/day) SMP may work but the low information
density of ASN.1 encoded var-binds (vs.
raw data) opens a concern regarding the
amount of network bandwidth needed.
TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
Activities (continued)
- Filtering at the source - Filtering capabilities are built into
for limited extractions. AITP. If the MIB is defined with filter
variables that can be set by S*MP, then
similar functions can be performed if the
instance identifiers are remapped to only
those records that pass the filters.
- Error feedback from - S*MP and AITP provide similar
manager node. capabilities.
- Connection maintenance - Not an issue for AITP as protocol defines
during long data gathering how to drop connection after request and
and filtering operations. re-establish connection on reply to
prevent hogging unused resources. Not
an issue for S*MP when if run over UDP.
BOTTOM LINE:
We need to work though these issues and
get inputs from TADMIN members that
were not present at this meeting.
Attachments:
1. "If I am a machine on the network, in order to be administered from
a central location, I have to be able to ..." list and partial
analysis.
2. Trusted Admin working group document history.
TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
If I am a machine on the network, in order to be administered from a
central location, I have to be able to ...
1. Authenticate an administrator.
2. Authenticate myself (or be authenticated) to an administrator.
3. Add/delete/disable users.
4. Respond to local and remote administration.
5. Tell other systems that the user has changed his/her password.
6. Allow users to change their passwords.
7. Allow user privilege to be modified.
8. Maintain synchronization with "master database."
9. Get data from central database.
10. Synchonize time with all other systems in domain of interest.
11. Synchonize time with central administrator.
12. Protect security relevant data.
13. Provide audit data as requested.
14. Explicitly audit administrative actions.
15. Send/Receive alerts of security events.
16. Administer "privileges" in various vendor formats.
17. Administrate various vendor labeling formats. [deleted]
18. Confirm integrity of administration messages (and provide trustworthy
responses).
19. Modify privileges of local system.
20. Modify "accreditation range" of other systems (or self) in response
to administrative updates.
21. Change user clearance.
22. Validate the network (or provide needed information to a centralized
validation application).
23. Recover from errors in administrative exchanges.
24. Guarantee delivery of administrative messages.
25. Know who I can talk to (other machines).
26. Not have to know other systems in order to initiate administrative
actions (i.e. be able to work through another server to allow other
systems at higher levels to be hidden).
TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
"If I am a machine ..." list (continued)
27. Provide remote proedure API to local administrative functions.
28. Ensure unique user ID across arbitrarily large admininstrative domain.
29. Catch up if I am down when administrative changes occur.
30. "Self audit" to generate minimum number of audit records at the
granularity of complete administrative actions.
31. Add a new remote host.
High Low
Class Must Want Want Note
---------- ------------ ----------- -------------- ----------------
Managed 1,2,3,4,7,9, 5,6,8,11, 8,11,13,14, Depends on
Secure 11,12,13,14, 13,14,15, Policy (8, 11,
Node 18, 19, 13,14,
Not our job (17,
Killed (10,
Manager 16,
---------------------------
TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
Trusted Admin working group document history.
Document Title
Number (- history & distinquishing characteristics)
-------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The Need for SITP
- 1 - 1/26/92 introduced to TSIG 1/28/92
2. Audit Event Criteria
- 1 - faxed to TSIG 1/28/92
3. Security Information Transfer Protocol (SITP)
- 1.0 - discussed at TSIG 1/29/92
- 2.0 - added set functionality 4/92
4. Host Audit Data Event Types and Formats
(as defined by SAC)
- 1 - faxed to TSIG 1/18/92
5. What and When to Audit During Trusted Sessions
- 1 - 1/28/92
6. Audit Information Transfer Protocol (AITP)
- 2.1 - formerly SITP, discussed at TSIG 7/14/92
"David Belote" <>
"Lee Benzinger" <lab@wdl1.wdl.loral.com>
"Charles Blauner" <chazx@ctt.bellcore.com>
"Luc Boulianne" <lucb@cs.mcgill.ca>
"Jeff Case" <case@cs.utk.edu>
"Robert Cooney" <cooney@wnyose.nctsw.navy.mil>
"Jeffrey Edelheit" <edelheit@mitre.org>
"William Huyck" <>
"Nina Lewis" <nina@cam.unisys.com>
"Vern McGeorge" <vern@hpda.cup.hp.com>
"Wally Ramsey" <wbr@mitre.org>
"Bradley Rhoades" <bdrhoades@mmc.mmmg.com>
"Paul Vazquez" <vazquez@dockmaster.ncsc.mil>
"Moira West" <mjw@cert.org>
"Peter Williams" <p.williams@uk.ac.ucl.cs>